Introduction
The past decade has borne witness to the transformation of South Africa's natural resources law with the introduction of a new legal concept to South African jurisprudence. The table for transformation was set with Section 3 of the National Water Act, 1 in which the concept of "public trusteeship" was formally introduced into South African law without great fanfare. Then followed the National Environmental Management Act, 2 the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 3 and the National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act, 4 each ingraining this novel concept of "public trusteeship" more firmly into South African jurisprudence. With the promulgation of these pieces of legislation, the state has had conferred upon it the obligation to act as either trustee or custodian of the environment or a specific natural resource, whilst the environment or that particular natural resource has been bequeathed to the people of South Africa.
In the quest to demystify the incorporation of the concept of "public trusteeship" in South Africa, this article, as a first tentative step, proposes focusing solely on the public trust doctrine as it functions in American jurisprudence. It is the aim of the article to give a thorough theoretical exposition of the development and application of the public trust doctrine in American jurisprudence in order to provide the South 
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African scholar with a perspective on a legal construct founded on the philosophical notion that governments exercise a "fiduciary trust" on behalf of their people.
The concept of "public trusteeship", as it is embodied in South African legislation, encapsulates the sovereign's duty to act as guardian of certain interests to the benefit of the nation as a whole. This concept is founded securely in legal philosophy. Locke stated in his Second Treatise on Civil Government 5 (1685) that governments merely exercise a "fiduciary trust" on behalf of their people. Pound 6 suggests that the role of states in the management of common natural resources must be limited to "a sort of guardianship for social purposes" and Marx 7 voices the opinion that:
From the standpoint of a higher socio-economic formation, the private property of particular individuals in the earth will appear just as absurd as private property of one man in other men. Even an entire society, a nation, or all simultaneously existing societies taken together, are not owners of the earth. They are simply its possessors, its beneficiaries, and have to bequeath it in an improved state to succeeding generations as boni patres familias.
Through the concept of "public trusteeship", a stewardship ethic has been incorporated into South African natural resources law.
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It is important to realise that public trusteeship is more that the embodiment of a philosophical thought. It is a concept that forms the core of respectable foreign legal constructs. In this regard, one can refer to the Anglo-American public trust doctrine, the notion found in French jurisprudence in which a clear distinction is made between le domain public and propriété (private ownership), and the concept applicable in German jurisprudence in which a "certain category of property can be removed from the sphere of private property altogether" 9 or in which "a certain category of property rights can be transformed into public-law rights for the sake of 124/189 more effective control". 10 All of these are examples of legal constructs founded on a variation of the same philosophy -that in some defined instances, governments act solely as guardians or custodians on behalf of the people they represent. Although based on the same philosophical foundation, the application and consequences of each of these foreign legal constructs differ substantially.
Therefore, it would be much too simplistic to summarily equate public trusteeship as it is found in South African legislation with the embodiment of either a philosophical idea or a complicated foreign legal doctrine. The mystery that surrounds the concept of "public trusteeship", as it has been introduced through legislation into South
African jurisprudence, demands that it be unravelled in the course of time. This process will necessitate comparative analysis and innovative thinking, but it is a process in which we shall inevitably have to engage, for the incorporation of the concept of "public trusteeship" has profoundly influenced property theory and the law of property in particular, given that the notion challenges the known concepts of "ownership" and "property" in South African jurisprudence. In the South African context, the way in which any "thing" can belong to the "nation" or the "people of South Africa" must firstly be determined, should neither the nation nor the "people of South Africa" be entities (or an entity) clothed with legal personality enabling them to acquire or hold property. Whilst South African courts have referred to "the State fulfilling its role as custodian holding the environment in public trust for the people", 11 there has been no attempt in reported cases to give a thorough exposition of the notion. 10 BVerfGE 58, 300 (339) 
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This article intends to give an account of the historical development and application of the public trust doctrine in American jurisprudence with specific reference to the nature and scope of the doctrine, whilst highlighting the consequences of the application of the doctrine for both environmental and property law.
The American public trust doctrine
The modern public trust doctrine is controversial and complex. 12 It has been hailed as the ultimate environmental protection tool by many ecologists and environmentalists, 13 yet others have criticised it. 14 Some perceive the doctrine as ground-breaking, yet others feel it destroys the basic fabric of property law.
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As a distinction is made in literature between the traditional public trust doctrine and the modern public trust doctrine, the discussion begins with a brief view of the traditional public trust doctrine and the legal nature of the doctrine, and then describes the public trust doctrine as a contemporary legal construct.
2.1
The traditional public trust doctrine
The essence of the traditional public trust doctrine
The public trust doctrine was developed in the American legal system in response to the desire to determine the ownership of the beds of navigable waters. 16 It was the product of an effort to reconcile the opposing concepts of "common ownership", The public trust doctrine essentially recognises that certain public uses ought to be specifically protected.
19
It entails the distinction between private title and public rights and recognises that the state, as sovereign, acts as trustee of public rights in certain natural resources. 20 As such, the public trust doctrine embodies the arguments of Marx, Pound and Locke referred to in the introduction of this article.
The legal consequences of applying this line of thought to a legal system culminated in the drawing of a distinction between property that could be owned privately or granted to private entities and property incapable of ordinary and private occupation, 17 Fernandez 1998 Alb L Rev 627 states that the Roman concepts of "common property" and "public rights" were incorporated by the English into both the Magna Charta and the English common law. [P]reventing the destabilising disappointment of expectations held in common but without formal recognition such as title. The function of the public trust as a legal doctrine is to protect such public expectations against destabilising changes, just as we protect conventional private property from such changes.
According to Lazarus 1986 Iowa L Rev 633 , "the historical function of the public trust doctrine has been to provide a public property basis for resisting the exercise of private property rights in natural resources deemed contrary to the public interest". Searle 1990 SC L Rev 898 concisely describes the concept as "state ownership of property held exclusively for the benefit of and use by the general public". Rasband 1998 U Colo L Rev 331 holds that the doctrine described the state's fiduciary responsibilities with respect to land under navigable water and certain associated resources. See also Williams 2002 SC Envtl LJ 31. 20 Glass v Goeckel 473 Mich 667 (2005 127/189 reserved to be accessed by and used to the benefit of the public. 21 Because certain interests such as navigation and fishing were sought to be preserved for the benefit of public use in the early American society, property used for those purposes was distinguished from public property. The latter could be granted to private owners by the sovereign. 22 The former was subject to the state's dominium and could not be relinquished.
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Initially, only land covered by tidal waters was subject to the protection of the doctrine. 24 Gradually, the geographical reach of the doctrine was extended 25 to cover all navigable waters and the land beneath them, without reducing the scope of the public trust in tidelands.
26
Although states could exercise their dominium only in a way that would ensure freedom in the use of property subject to the doctrine -a use consistent with the public interest -the use of lands subject to the public trust doctrine could be modified or altered. Any modification of existing use was permissible as long as the public interest was not substantially impaired.
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In both the Martin and Shively cases, it was held that since the suit property was held in trust for the public, property clothed with this perpetual public right of user could not easily be alienated In the Shively case 11-12, Justice Gray explained the common law perspective on the nature of the sovereign's claim when dealing with navigable waters and the sea:
Such waters, and the land which they cover, either at all times, or at least when the tide is in, are incapable of ordinary and private occupation, cultivation, and improvement; and their natural and primary uses are public in their nature … Therefore the title, jus privatum, in such lands … belongs to the king, as the sovereign; and the dominium thereof, jus publicum, is vested in him, as the representative of the nation for the public benefit.
See also the Illinois Central case 452. 24 The "public common of piscary" is included in the dominium of navigable water. Courts found that a stricter standard than usual was to be applied in instances in which conveyances were scrutinised. There was a presumption against the sovereign's intention to part with any portion of the public domain, unless clear and specific words to that effect were used.
29 It was also held that whatever title the grantee took was burdened by the public trust and would be read in conformity with it. 30 The state lacked the power to diminish public trust rights when trust property was conveyed to private parties. 31 Thus, when a private party acquired property burdened with the public trust, it acquired only the jus privatum.
The test to determine the validity of alienation would, therefore, lie in the question of whether the grant was of such magnitude that the state would effectively have given up its authority to govern the property to protect the public's rights in the property.
32
Scrutiny of the traditional public trust doctrine highlights the following features:
33
(a) the doctrine applied to tidal and navigable waters and the soil covered by these waters;
(b) original state ownership of these resources was confirmed;
(c) this state ownership was not unrestricted but was subject to the public's right of use for purposes of navigation, fishing and commerce;
(d) the uses of navigation, fishing and commerce were the only protected uses, and it can be inferred that it was not the broad public interest in the resources that was protected but the public interest in relation to these specific uses. These interests were deemed protectable in accordance with the societal values of the era in which they originated; (e) public uses could be diminished or altered so long as the public interest was not substantially impaired;
(f) the courts could apply public trust reasoning when scrutinising government dealings in connection with trust resources, and could even put an end to and reverse government actions not in line with the principles of the trust; and 
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(g) on the rare occasions that trust property was alienated, the property received by the new owner would be subject to the conditions of the trust.
The classification of the traditional public trust doctrine
The classification of the "public trust" as a true legal trust has been supported and opposed. On the one hand, Stevens 34 suggests that American law adopted the trust analogy to satisfy the need to identify an owner of at least the legal title to the resources in which people had a common right. In a legal regime that recognised title to waters and submerged lands in the King, it was possible to describe the rights held in common by the members of the public either as an easement or as an equitable interest in property in which the King had legal title. Because the King was clearly distinct from the people (that is, the trustees and the beneficiary were not the same), the trust model is applicable. Nevertheless, the questions of who created the trust, and thus its purpose, remain unanswered.
In the American context, this explanation would not suffice. To position the notion within the trust concept, more is needed than the mere acknowledgement that legal title can be said to vest in the state whilst the equitable title vests in the public. 39 The tripartite nature of the creation and operation of trusts disqualifies the traditional American public trust from being classified as a true legal trust.
40 34 Stevens 1980 UC Davis LR 195, 197-198; Huffman 1989 It appears that the word "trust" refers to the fiduciary responsibility of the sovereign rather than to the legal nature of the doctrine. The state fulfils the duty imposed on it by the public trust doctrine, by honouring the restraint on alienation and protecting the public's right of use. The public trust right exists not at the grace of the sovereign, but despite it. In its traditional, common-law formulation, the traditional public trust doctrine is therefore best understood as an easement that members of the public hold in common. 41 Drawing from the earliest origins of the public trust doctrine, Huffman 42 indicates that the doctrine was the basis of private rather than public rights: "The private rights were held in common by all members of the public, but they were exercised privately." As such, it falls within the sphere of property law.
43

The modern public trust doctrine
Considering the law has no life of its own and that property, like any other social institution, has a social function to fulfil, 44 it is not remarkable to find that the traditional public trust doctrine has evolved into a modern public trust doctrine. It has been stated that the public trust doctrine "perseveres as a value system and an ethic as its expression in law mutates and evolves". 45 Development began once the doctrine's reach was expanded from tidewaters to navigable waters, 46 and changing public needs created by growth and progress have since stimulated further development. What was formerly a common-law principle has evolved into a modern doctrine with interests in constitutional and statutory law.
the creator define the relationship between the parties holding legal and equitable title. In attempting to determine which parties are the creator, trustee and beneficiary of the alleged trust of the public trust doctrine, Huffman points out that the public can be identified as the beneficiary and the state as the trustee. However, a single entity cannot be both the trustee and beneficiary of a trust:
The democratic state is the agent of the people. It acts at the behest of the people and, therefore, for the benefit of the people. The people cannot act as fiduciary, through the state, for themselves.
The question as to the identity of the creator can also not be answered. 41 Huffman 1989 Envtl L 527. 42 Huffman 1989 Envtl L 550. 43 Coquillette 1979 Hannig 1983 Santa Clara L Rev 211. 44 Stevens 1980 UC Davis LR 199. 45 Takacs 2008 In the Shively case 20 the state's rights in navigable water and the soil beneath it is confirmed..
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The development and principles underlying this development will be scrutinised in the following section. The development concerns mainly the codification of the doctrine and the expansion of its scope. The underlying principles described above remained unchanged. 47 Through incorporating a wider genre of objects under the public trust, the doctrine has expanded to protect more than navigation and fishing rights from both individual exploiters and corrupt or incompetent governments. By placing public trust property in a unique property regime in which it is neither susceptible to unlimited private ownership nor unrestricted state ownership, and by binding the state with the responsibility of guarding the public's interest in that specific object, a unique property interest was vested in each member of the public purported to be protected by the public trust -normally the citizens of the country. In order to be an effective tool in the trade of environmental protection, the public trust doctrine had to possess three characteristics. It had to create an obligation that could be enforceable against the government, it had to vest some concept of a legal right in the general public, and it had to be capable of being interpreted consistent with contemporary concerns for environmental quality. 53 Sax 54 believed that the public trust doctrine possessed all three of the required attributes, and that this therefore rendered it "useful as a tool of general application for citizens seeking to develop a comprehensive legal approach to resource management problems".
The development of the traditional public trust doctrine into the modern public trust doctrine
Sax understood the principle underlying the Roman concepts of "res omnium communes" and "res publicae" and valued the protection given to certain public uses in the English common law. He found that those same principles underlie the 133/189 theories was that "certain interests are so intrinsically important to every citizen that their free availability tends to mark the society as one of citizens rather than of serfs".
57
It was, therefore, unthinkable that any person could claim a private property interest to the detriment of the community. A related principle was that "certain interests are so particularly the gifts of nature's bounty that they ought to be reserved for the whole of the populace".
58
Then there was also the recognition "that certain uses have a peculiarly public nature that makes their adaptation to private use inappropriate". Recognising that public rights' protection was thus being accorded not only to traditional trust objects, but also to "other areas of special public importance farther inland", 66 Olson analysed the courts' ratio decidendi, which is binding on courts in lower jurisdictions owing to the application of the stare decisis rule. He wished to find an underlying principle that would indicate the extent to which the doctrine could be expanded. 67 The common principle he found in all the cases he referred to is aptly encapsulated in the following citation:
68
The public trust doctrine -like all common law principles -should not be considered fixed or static, but should be molded and extended to meet changing conditions and needs of the public it was created to benefit.
The area of application of the doctrine could be expanded in terms of the same principle that governed the first expansion from tidewaters to navigable waters.
69
This illustrates that law in a democratic society reflects society's values. Although it was established that the range of public purposes protected by the trust is dictated by the "public need for continued protection of a public benefit related and attached to the land", 70 the parameters of the "public need" were not finally determined by the 
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developments of the public trust doctrine had occurred and in all likelihood will occur in state courts. 81 The development that took place in individual states illustrates the evolutionary character of the law. 82 Dunning, 83 however, returns our attention to the historical classification of the resources covered by the doctrine. He emphasises that the two most important characteristics that a resource must possess before it can be regarded as protected by the doctrine are scarcity and natural suitability for common use: "Common use by the general population serves as the basis to characterise these natural resources as common heritage or public trust assets."
84
The sovereign's responsibility lies within this parameter as the government has an obligation to preserve the people's historic freedom of access. This, argues Dunning, 85 is what justifies the demand that the state recognise a public property right and that the courts limit legislative abolition or modification of that property right.
The initial aim of using the public trust doctrine as a device for ensuring that valuable government-controlled resources are not diverted to the sole benefit of private profit seekers 86 has exploded into an all-embracing environmental protection mechanism.
In cases in which the traditional doctrine evolved to protect common rights of access for commercial purposes, the modern public trust doctrine proclaims conservationist principles. It is this expansion of the doctrine to cover property not previously subsumed by the doctrine that elicits criticism. For the benefit of present and future generations, the State and its political subdivisions shall conserve and protect Hawaii's natural beauty and all natural resources, including land, water, air, minerals and energy sources, and shall promote the development and utilisation of these resources in a manner consistent with their conservation and in furtherance of the self-sufficiency of the State. All public natural resources are held in trust by the State for the benefit of the people.
In Florida, the public trust doctrine is incorporated in In American jurisprudence, the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment prevents the government from taking "private property … for public use without just compensation". However, a "taking" need not arise from an actual physical occupation of land by the government. The Supreme Court has held that "if a regulation goes too far it will be recognised as a taking". 
Perspectives from practice
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In the National Audubon Society case, the public trust doctrine was formulated to allow the state to reconsider 109 water allocation decisions that permitted harm to come to the corpus of the trust, even though the initial allocation decisions were made after due consideration of their effect on the public trust. The purpose of the modern trust doctrine was defined by the court as follows:
110
The public trust is more than an affirmation of state power to use public property for public purposes. It is an affirmation of the duty of the state to protect the people's common heritage of streams, lakes, marshlands and tidelands, surrendering that right of protection only in rare cases when the abandonment of that right is consistent with the purposes of the trust.
The court confirmed that the public trust doctrine preserves the continuing sovereign power of the state to protect uses for water deemed to be in the public interest, as there are no "vested rights" in trust property. 111 Although the decision in this case was merely advisory because no vested rights had been affected directly, the California Supreme Court suggested that it would reject a claim that these reductions constitute takings for which compensation is required, as no one is divested of any title to property. However, this could result in the total annihilation of owners' rights towards their property or exclude current right holders.
112
The Washington Supreme Court expressed a similar opinion in Orion Corporation v State of Washington.
113
The Court held that the public trust precludes a constitutional claim for taking without compensation because title to trust resources is acquired subject to whatever state action may be deemed necessary to protect the public's interest in the trust resources. 
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Perhaps the most far-reaching extension of the public trust doctrine is illustrated by the Hawaiian case In re Water Use Permit Applications. 115 Here, the court imposed a broad version of the doctrine onto the state's fresh water supply, thereby rewriting
Hawaii's legislative water code. The court held that "resource protection" was a protected public trust use of such resources. In response to a taking objection, the court stated:
116
[T]he reserved sovereign prerogatives over the waters of the state precludes the assertion of vested rights to water contrary to public trust purposes. This restriction preceded the formation of property rights in this jurisdiction; in other words, the right to absolute ownership of water exclusive of the public trust never accompanied the 'bundle of rights' conferred … Hamline LR 54, who contends that explicit notice of the public trust interest in land is not necessary and is assumed to run with trust resources from the moment of statehood. His view does not explain the inclusion of nontraditional resources within the scope of the doctrine. See also Grant 1995 Ariz St LJ 427. 118 Manzanetti 1984 Pac LJ 1306 explains that according to the theory of pre-existing title, the state has always had a title in the property. Property holders should therefore have known that the state had pre-existing title when they acquired their property; and when the state acts to reassert title to the detriment of the property holder, compensation is not required. The need for compensation under the Fifth Amendment is obviated by the prior knowledge of the pre-existing title. The reason for this contention is that should the property holder have had notice of the preexisting title in the state, the reassertion of the rights in the title would have caused neither a change in the law, nor a change in the structural rules under which the property holder was to make choices regarding expectations in his property rights. Should, however, announcement by the state that a pre-existing title clouded the property holder's title constitute "a sudden change in state law, unpredicted in terms of relevant precedents", government action pursuant to that announcement would constitute a deprivation of property for which compensation is required. Lazarus 1986 Iowa L Rev 673 supports Manzanetti's argument that parties who engage in economic activities in an area that they know is of public concern and regulated by government are on notice that the government may regulate in the future. For that reason, they cannot complain when their investments are adversely affected by subsequent regulations. 119 Manzanetti 1984 Pac LJ 1307 . Grant 1995 
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Reed 126 warns that the public trust doctrine should not be regarded as creating a reversionary right by which the public can reclaim trust property long lost. In cases in which the public uses secured by the doctrine are lost for any significant period of time, the doctrine should cease to apply. He emphasises the importance of the law's interest in the stability of land title and argues that the "re-emergence of an ancient doctrine should not be allowed to upset titles created and relied upon previous to the doctrine's rediscovery". 
Impairment of the public trust and limitation on government activities
The limitations placed on government's activities, strictly speaking, determine the scope of the public trust doctrine. The state is regarded as the trustee of property impressed with the public trust doctrine, and the legislature is charged with the task of managing the trust. 128 As such, an affirmative duty is imposed on the legislature to act in all circumstances in which action is necessary, be it to preserve or promote that which is held in trust. 129 The judiciary is to act as a watchdog of the trust, and existing precedents have indicated that the judiciary would go beyond form to substance to ensure that the legislative authority fulfils its duty in administering the trust.
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The broadest parameter of the public trust doctrine, therefore, has its origin in the state's valid exercise of the police power and the power of eminent domain in the reallocation and disposition of natural resources. 131 The public trust doctrine is also an additional limitation on the exercise of the police power and the power of eminent domain in relation to the reallocation of natural resources. In a sense, this doctrine expands the exercise of police power because stricter regulation may be required to However, the view that the doctrine is a source of authority for state regulation is viewed by some commentators as a distortion of the historical purpose of the public trust doctrine:
The problem with the equation of public trust and police power is that the public trust doctrine purports to be the basis of a rights claim rather than a source of governmental power. Because public trust rights are understood to predate other property rights, their status in relation to those rights claims is always prior in time, and therefore, superior in right. There can be no claim that enforcement of public trust right results in a taking because individual property rights are by definition subject to the prior public rights.
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The public trust doctrine simultaneously provides a basis for the state to retain continuing jurisdiction over the trust corpus so that continuing choices dictated by the public need can be made. 135 However, the power of eminent domain may be limited in cases in which a public trust is shown to be present in the resource, as the taking needs to be proved consistent with the public's right to use the resource.
Five elements have been identified on the basis of case law as the criteria that must be applied when the factual determination of justified impairment of the trust corpus is to be made. 136 The application of the following five basic concepts will indicate the extent and validity of the impairment:
(a) some retention of governmental control; 132 Lazarus 1986 Iowa L Rev 655 states that developments in the public trust arena in the early 1980s were confined to suits in which the private citizen was the plaintiff asserting the doctrine and the government was the unwilling defendant resisting the trust's application. Government argued that the public trust doctrine expands sovereign authority over natural resources covered by the doctrine, limiting the nature of valid private property rights in those resources whilst rendering permissible governmental measures that impinge on those private interests. 
Classification of the modern public trust doctrine
There appears to be no unanimity on the nature of the modern public trust doctrine.
American courts have treated the doctrine largely as a public property right of access to certain public trust resources for various public purposes.
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It can thus be described as a public easement 140 or servitude.
141
Whilst no suggestion can be found that the traditional public trust doctrine had any relation with constitutional law, 142 the codification and reception of the doctrine into state constitutions and statutes warrant a present-day classification of the doctrine as constitutional law in relevant circumstances. 143 In cases in which the doctrine is applicable only as a common-law doctrine and was judicially expanded, it will be difficult to classify it under constitutional law. Although the doctrine originated from the common law, it can be viewed today as a body of legal thought incorporating both common and statutory law protecting natural resources. 
Conclusion
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The article aimed to give a thorough theoretical exposition of the development and application of the public trust doctrine in American jurisprudence in order to provide the South African scholar with a perspective on a legal construct founded on the philosophical notion that governments merely exercise a "fiduciary trust" on behalf of their people. As it falls outside the scope of the article to compare the American public trust doctrine with the concept of "public trusteeship" as it is embodied in South African legislation (a comparison that could be made only after more legal constructs founded on the same line of thought have been researched), I conclude with a summary of the doctrine as it finds application in American jurisprudence.
The contemporary American public trust doctrine can be characterised as a public right in property. As against a private easement or servitude, it can be described as a public servitude. Through the application of the doctrine, certain rights vest in the citizens of America as an entity, but American citizens can demand the realisation and protection of that interest as individuals. The government is compelled to deal with the objects that are regarded as public trust property in such a way that the public's right in that property is promoted and enhanced. Simultaneously, the government must refrain from actions that would negate the interest of the public in the trust property. The government's ability to deal freely with public trust property is thus definitely curtailed by the purpose of the public trust and restricted to custodianship or guardianship of the relevant property.
Individuals' rights in public trust property are likewise curtailed. No individual can attain unrestricted private title in public trust property, as the property is bound by the public easement. Individuals must, however, ensure that their rights in public trust property are realised. As the judiciary is the watchdog of the public trust with the power to annihilate government actions that go against the aim and purpose of the public trust, individuals must not refrain from insisting on protection in instances in which the need arises.
The concept of a "public trust" should not be confused with the concept of "public interest". "Public interest" is a broad concept and basically every action that has public value or generates economic gain is in the public interest. The term "public 149/189 trust" refers to matters of common property that are held in trust by the state for the use and benefit of present and future generations of citizens. There is a nuanced difference between protecting public uses and "ensuring that environmental resources are beneficially used in the public interest". As indicated above, property subject to the trust may not be used for any and every public purpose. The property must be held available for use by the public, but it must be maintained for certain types of uses, which include traditional uses or uses that are in some sense related to or compatible with the natural uses peculiar to that resource.
The public trust doctrine is a common-law doctrine of American jurisprudence. Its field of application can be and has been expanded according to public need. The expansion of both the geographical scope of the doctrine and the range of interests protected by the doctrine is a result of the recognition that "public need" dictates the direction of growth, as in any other field of the law. The possibility of conflict generated by the expansion of the doctrine is inevitable. In a society in which the divide between rich and poor is constantly growing, in an overpopulated world in which the most needy have already lost the race for the use of resources, the public trust doctrine is a mechanism that guards against the exploitation of a country's natural treasures. 
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